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FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS AND THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS
PosT-W.v reparations and the need for economic rehabilitation created an
inordinately heavy demand for foreign exchange among the nations defeated
in the world war.1 Foreign loans granted to meet these demands served only
to increase the debt burden. And when the sources of foreign capital dried
up during the depression, the debtor nations lacked sufficient gold to continue
servicing their debts. According to classical economic theory, the gold stand-
ard would function automatically to adjust the balance of payments and,
where necessary, the course of trade between countries, in such a way that
all payments might be made.2 But several factors had appeared to obstruct
the process of natural adjustment. Increasing national regulation of industry
and sterilization of creditor nations' gold supplies tended to make the inter-
national economic system less susceptible to gold movements.3 Furthermore,
since the creditor nations erected tariff and quota barriers,4 and since the
debtor nations themselves devoted their capital to such unproductive fields
as rearmament, 5 the latter were prevented from creating an export surplus
with which to pay their foreign debts.
With rapidly diminishing gold supplies and no ready means of securing
foreign exchange, a steadily increasing number of these foreign debtor
countries have turned to governmental regulations to protect their currencies.
Transfer prohibitions and govermental monopolies of foreign exchange are
the most common expedients for maintaining gold and foreign exchange sup-
plies. Regulations enacted by Germany during the last six years 7 have
achieved a special notoriety because of their effect-upon large financial inter-
1. HARRIs, GERMANY'S FoRIMGN INDEBTEDNESS (1935) 1; .MADDEz, NADImI AND
SAuvAiN, AmC&s EXPERIENCE AS A CRzrrOR NATION (1937) 166,
2. SALTER, RECOVERY, THE SECOND EFFORT (1932) 71; TODD, Tig MECHANIsn or
EXCHANGE (1917) 131.
3. MfADDEN, NADLER AND SAuvArx, op. cit. supra note 1, at 163, 176.
4. See Schacht, German Trade and German Debts (1934) 13 Foreign Affairs 1;
Summary of statements of Mir. Schacht, (1934) 139 Comm. & FiN. Canon. 1318.
5. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE ComZsiSsioN, REPORT ON PROTECrIV= AND REOrGAzi-
zAT N ComnsrrrEs (1937) Part V, 419; Auld, Tie Dawes and Young Loans: Then
and Now (1934) 13 FOREIGN AFFAiRs 6; Comstock, Blocked Marks and American
Creditors, BARROx's, Jan. 29, 1934, p. 18.
6. See Publication of Reichsstelle ffir den Aussenhandel, DAs Dwsur.-nEcir DER
WELP (1936); 0hlin, fechanisms and Objecthes of Exchange Control (1937) 27 A21.
EcoN. REv., Supp. 1, p. 141.
7. The most important German statutes in force at present are: Acts of Feb. 4,
1935, (1935) RCEICHSGESETZBLATT I, 106; Dec. 19, 1936, (1936) REMcnsGEsrmLArr I,
1021; June 9, 1933, (1933) REicHsGEsErzB.ATr I, 349; May 27, 1937, (1937) REnxcs-
GESETZBLATr I, 600. See generally EINzIG, GmaxANv's DEFAULT (1934); HAR=-sm.x,
DEwvsENNoTREcnT (1935-1936); FLAD-BmGHOLD-FAnRICiUS, DAs Nzuu DMvSENEUc r
(1935-1937).
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ests.8 Their outstanding feature is the virtual prohibition, under grave
penalty,0 of the payment of public and private foreign debts, 10 including even
payments made outside of Germany. Interest and principal due to foreign
creditors must be paid to designated banking institutions in Germany, and
these payments discharge the original debt. The foreign creditor may then
expend the "blocked accounts" arising from repayment of principal only
for certain narrowly limited purposes within Germany," and he receives the
interest payments only in the form of long-term quasi-governmental de-
bentures.12
The result has been to reduce the present foreign value of obligations owed
by solvent German debtors' 3 as much as seventy-five per cent,' 4 while at
the same time German creditors are assured repayment in undepreciated
currency. Consequently it is not strange to find foreign creditors exerting
pressure upon their governments to protect their interests. Those nations
whose imports from Germany exceed their exports have been able to compel
the satisfaction of their nationals' claims by threatening to impound the pay-
ment balances due to Germany. Under this stimulus Germany has signed
clearing treaties by which these payment balances are utilized to liquidate
German foreign debts.'; But the United States, whose exports to Germany
exceed its imports,16 has been unable to make use of this weapon; and the
8. Germany's public and private long-term foreign indebtedness was estimated at
10.7 billions Reichsmarks (about 2.55 billions dollars) as of November, 1931; 7.2 bil-
lions Reichsmarks (2.88 billions dollars) as of February, 1934; and 6.1 billions Retchs-
marks (2.44 billions dollars) as of February, 1936. STATxSTISCHES JAHRBUCII FRn DAS
DEUTSCHE REICH (1936) 506. Americans are estimated by the State Department to hold
about $1,800,000,000 of German securities, of which about $1,170,000,000 are long and
medium term obligations affected by the German regulations. See FOREIaN BONDHOLDERS
PROTECTIVE COUNCIL, INC., ANNUAL REPORT 1936, 405; (1934) 138 Cowi~. & FIN.
CHRoN. 4375.
9. In cases of "unscrupulous and egotistical" contraventions the penalty for a Ger-
man citizen may be sentence of death and confiscation of property. Act of Dec. 1,
1936, (1936) REcsaGsErzBLArrT I, 999.
10. Short term debts to foreign banks are the subject-matter of the so-called stand-
still agreements. See HARRIS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 22.
11. See EINZIG, op. cit. supra note 7, at 111; HARRIS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 32.
12. See FOREIGN BONDHOLDERS PROTECTIVE COUNCIL, ANNUAL RErOIcr 1936, 511-
513; PooR's (1937) FISCAL VOLUmE 73; PooR's (1937) INDUSTRIALS 3129.
13. The solvency of the individual German debtors is generally not disputed. The
difficulties are caused solely by the transfer restrictions. See Institute of International
Finance, Bull. 72 (September 4, 1934) p. 7.
14. See PooR's (1937) FISCAL VOLUME 73 et seq.
15. See SEC REPORT, op. cit. supra note 5, at 425, 435 ct seq.; Ritter, Germany's
Experience with Clearing Agreements (1936) 14 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 465; Rosset, Les
Accords de Clearing et les Obligations Contractuelles (1936) VERHANDLUNGEN DES
SCHWEIZERISCHEN JURISTENVEREINS II, 201a.
16. FOREIGN BONDHOLDERS' PROTECTIVE CouNCIL, ANNUAL REPORT 1934, 72.
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vigorous protests lodged with the German government by the Department
of State have proved an unavailing substitute.1 7
Litigation involving these currency regulations may arise in two types of
situations. A creditor whose government has not been able to compel satis-
faction of his debt may attach the foreign assets of his German debtor.1 s Or
a creditor may sue his non-German debtor who has promised to make a
payment in Germany now illicit under the German regulations. In each case
the court is faced with the question whether the German prohibitions con-
stitute a valid defense to the creditor's suit.19 While the answer may be
affected by the general principles determining what law governs a contract,
this Comment will confine itself to a discussion of the specific problems
raised by the foreign currency statutes.
Contracts subject to American law. Even where the contracts in suit were,
by their main points of contact, dearly localized in America, German cor-
porate debtors have sought the shelter of their domestic statutes by invoking
the rule subjecting corporations to the laws of their domicile,20 apparently
in order to argue that the currency prohibitions made payment ultra vires.
But since foreign laws have been accorded extra-territorial effect upon this
theory only when they regulate the powers, organization, or relative rights
of security holders of foreign corporations, 2  the precedents would seem to
indicate that the currency restridtions, which do not relate to these matters,
17. Aide-Memoires and notes of the State Department to the German Govern-
ment, of June 27, July 17, October 13, November 25, 1934, PRsss RE.Asss OF THE DE-
PARTMENT OF STATE, no. 248 p. 444, no. 251 p. 60, no. 263 p. 248, no. 270 p. 325; FOEGZ.-
BONDHOLDERS POECT IVE CouNcIL, Annual Report (1935) 119; id. (1936) at 405.
18. An attempt was made to attach the German liner "Europa." See NEws-VES:,
Jan. 13, 1934, p. 23.
19. See generally BENDHEIM, DAs DEUTSCHE DEVISENnElIr Umn DIE SCIIWEMz
(1936); HumDuRG, EINWIRRUNG DES DEvxsENNOmc Us AUF PIUVATRECnTSVE nALT-
NISSE (1936); MAYER, DIE VALUTASCHULD NACM DEurscanm REcaT (1934); Nsu-
mANN, DEVIsENNOnRECHT UND INTERNATIONALES PRIvATIcnrr (1937) (the leading
monograph); Bergmann, Le Rigiine des Deises dans to Pralique das Droit Interna-
tional Prive (1936) 35 BULLrIN DE L'INSTITUT JURIDIQUE INTh-RIATIOAL 29; Caspa-
flus, Ungeliste Fragen auf dens Gebiet der Zivilrechtsfolgen der deutschcn Detisen-
gesetzgebung (1936/37) 86 IHERINGs JAHRBOcHER 33, 67; Cohn, Currency Restrictions
and the Conflict of Laws (1936) 52 L. Q. REv. 474; Dietrich, Die internationalrccht-
liche Bedeutung des Devisenrechts (1935) 64 Jurasrxscu Wocneuscxmn 3013;
Domke, La L.gislation Allenimade sur les Devises en Droit International Priv (1937)
64 JOURAL Du DRorr INTERNATIONAL (CLU-N-Er) 226; NVahle, Velche trlrungsreeht-
lich n Bestiniitungen empfehlen sich auif dent Gebiete des Privatreehts?; (1933) Szcusr
DEuTSCHER JURISTENTAG IN DER TSCHECHOSLOWAKEI, GUTAcn i 181.
20. Canada Southern Ry. v. Gebhardt, 109 U. S. 527 (1883); Sliosberg v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 244 N. Y. 482, 155 N. E. 749 (1927); Doyle v. French Telegaph
Cable Co., 244 App. Div. 586, 280 N. Y. Supp. 281 (1st Dep't 1935).
21. Second Russian Ins. Co. v. Miller, 268 U. S. 552 (1925); Guinness V. Phoenix
Ass. Co., Ltd., 196 App. Div. 495, 188 N. Y. Supp. 137 (1st Dep't 1921).
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are not applicable.22 Neither logic nor policy afford any warrant for accord-
ing extra-territorial effect to currency restrictions, which affect individuals
and corporations alike, merely because the debtor happens to be incorporated.
There is a second method by which German debtors, both corporate and
individual, have tried to invoke the currency restrictions as a defense. Grant-
ing the general proposition that American law governs the obligation, the
debtors have argued that they will be punished by the German courts for
any voluntary payment made either at home or abroad. The gravity of this
risk is claimed to render payment virtually impossible and therefore to
excuse performance under conventional contract doctrines.23  Whether the
danger is really so great as to render performance impossible may well be
doubted, for an involuntary payment, compelled by judgment and execution,
is not within the purview of the German penal provisions.24 But the existence
of impossibility, actual or otherwise, would seem to be irrelevant, since the
rule is generally said to be that impossibility due to foreign law is no defense,
at least where performance is due in the forum.25 It has been suggested
that the reason for this rule is an historical accident.20 The leading cases,
announcing that impossibility due to foreign law is no defense, were decided
before any type of impossibility was a defense and have since been regu-
larly followed. 27 But a sounder basis for the rule may be found in juris-
dictional theories of the conflict of laws. It is a familiar principle of inter-
state law that the legislature of one state may not by threat of punishment
22. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Siemens & Halska A. G., 15 F. Supp.
927 (S. D. N. Y. 1936), aff'd, 84 F. (2d) 993 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936), cert. denied, 299 U. S.
585 (1936).
23. Foreign prohibitions against trading with the enemy, otherwise inapplicable,
constitute a factual impossibility of performance. German Supreme Court, June 28,
1918, 93 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen 182. But see cases cited
infra note 59.
24. The defense of impossibility has been refused on this ground. Appeldoorn v.
Osram G. m. b. H., District Court of Amsterdam, March 22, 1935, (1935] Nederlandsche
Jurisprudentie 590; Nederlandsche Vakvereenigingen v. Bank der Deutschen Arbeit, Dis-
trict Court of Amsterdam, June 23, 1936, (1937] Nederlandsche Jurisprudentie 34;
Zenith A. T. v. Beer, Sondheimer & Co., Municipal Court of Oslo, Feb. 13, 1936,
Sj6fartstidende of Feb. 19, 1936; Rheinische Grundstiickshandelsgesellschaft. m. b. 1H.
v. Aktiengesellschaft ffir Immobilienwerte, Swiss Supreme Court, Oct. 8, 1935, 61
Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts II, 242.
25. Standard Silk Dyeing Co. v. Roessler & Hasslacher Chem. Co., 244 Fed. 250
(S. D. N. Y. 1917); Tweedie Trading Co. v. McDonald Co., 114 Fed. 985 (S. D. N. Y.
1902); Compagnie Universelle v. United States Service Co., 84 N. J. Eq. 604, 95 Atl.
187 (Ch. 1915), aff'd, 85 N. J. Eq. 601, 96 Atl. 292 (1916); Krulewitsch v. National
Importing & Trading Co., 195 App. Div. 544, 186 N. Y. Supp. 838 (1st Dep't 1921);
Trinidad S. & T. Co. v. Alston & Co. [1920] A. C. 888; cf. notes 26, 30, infra.
26. See 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) 3295; Comment (1921) 34 HARv. L. REv.
319; cf. RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS: (1932) § 458, comment c., § 461.
27. See 3 WILISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) 3295, n. 55.
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control its citizens' actions in other states.28  A similar rule governs the
distribution of legislative jurisdiction in international situations even though
there is no constitution to enforce it. Although each sovereign has the power,
respected by its own courts, to impose restrictions on the conduct of its
citizens abroad, the courts of other countries are reluctant to enforce within
their own jurisdictions the prohibitions imposed by foreign legislatures.O
Consequently, the courts have quite generally refused to sanction the in-
filtration of foreign prohibitions by stating that they create "impossibility. '"
Even contractual exemption clauses such as a promise to pay "so far as
lawfully possible" have been strained in vain to include the foreign currency
regulations. 3'
But impossibility occasioned by foreign law may be a defense in some
situations. Where suit is brought upon a contract subject to American law
but calling for payment in Germany, the currency restrictions would seem
to be an excuse for non-performance3 2 Debtors may rely on the foreign
prohibitions as causing impossibility even where acts which in the contempla-
tion of both parties had to be done abroad preparatory to performance have
become illegal. Thus the performance of a contract for the delivery of spe-
cific or fungible goods may be excused if both parties contemplated that the
promisor was to rely on exportation from a foreign country which subse-
quently forbids the export.33 Similarly, the repayment of a loan would seem
to be impossible, if the foreign debtor has promised only to remit the payment
from his domicile to this country and the domicile subsequently has enacted
transfer prohibitions.3 4
The rationalization for the rule is said to be that the forum will not order
the performance of an act which would be illegal at the place where it must
28. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578 (1897) ; Bothwell v. Buckbee, Mears Co.,
275 U. S. 274 (1927).
29. Second Russian Ins. Co. v. Miller, 268 U. S. 552 (1925); Southern P. R. R.
of Mexico v. Gonzales, 48 Ariz. 260, 61 P. (2d) 377 (1936); Guinness v. Phoenix Ass.
Co., Ltd., 196 App. Div. 495, 188 N. Y. Supp. 137 (1st Dep't 1921); see Furness, Withy
& Co. v. Rederiaktiebolaget Banco [1917] 2 K. B. 873, 876.
30. Perry v. North German Lloyd, 150 Misc. 73, 268 N. Y. Supp. 525 (funic. Ct.
N. Y., 1934); Sheppard v. Hamburg-Amerikanische Paketfahrt A. G., N. Y. L. J.,
March 14, 1934, p. 1232, col. 2 (Sup. Ct); Glynn v. United Steel Works Co., 160 Misc.
405, 289 N. Y. Supp. 1037 (Sup. Ct. 1935) ; Marks v. United Steel Works Co., 160 Misc.
678, 289 N. Y. Supp. 1035 (N. Y. City Ct., 1935); cf. Starr v. Chase National Bank,
N. Y. L. J., Sept. 21, 1936, p. 771, col. 6 (Sup. C.).
31. Marks v. United Steel Works Corp. and Glyna v. United Steel Works Corp.,
both cited supra, note 30.
32. De Bedche v. South American Stores [1935] A. C. 148 (the court failed to dis-
cuss which law governed the contract) ; cf. St. Pierre v. South American Stores [1937]
1 All Eng. Rep. 206.
33. Texas Co. v. Hogarth Shipping Co., 256 U. S. 619 (1921); Doulton & Co. v.
Corporation of Madras [1920] V. N. 11221.
34. Mayer v. Hungarian Commercial Bank, U. S. Dist. Ct., E. D. N. Y., July 28,
1937.
1938]
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be performed.35 But the rule apparently is of wider scope, for it operates
to discharge debtors in those instances where the contract is still executory.30
On the other hand, where a loan has been granted or goods sold, courts have
recognized the fact that it is unfair to leave the creditor without a remedy,
and have allowed him a recovery on the theory of restitution. 7 This result
is open to several objections. First, even though the contract is subject to
the law of the forum, it may be argued that matters concerning the termina-
tion are governed by the law of the place of performance 8 which in this
case discharges the debtor. But this rule has only presumptive force.,9 Prac-
tical considerations and the dominating contacts with the forum, at least
when the plaintiff is a citizen of the forum, would seem to be sufficient
reason for overcoming the presumption. Secondly, since granting restitu-
tion in loan transactions actually operates to remove the place of performance
from one country to another,40 this remedy may work hardship upon the
debtor. But as the creditor will be left without remedy in the absence of
such relief, a judicial modification of the contract terms would seem proper
after a careful evaluation of the interests of both parties.
Contracts subject to foreign law. Other considerations obtain in cases
where the relations of the parties to the contract would ordinarily be gov-
erned by German law. If the discharge of the debtor was authorized by the
German currency restrictions, a complete defense to suit in other countries
would ordinarily be available to the debtor in the absence of any other fac-
tors.41 The prohibitions cannot be brushed aside even by the debtor's express
35. Ralli Brothers v. Compania Naviera Sota y Aznar [1920] 2 K. B. 287; Kursell
v. Timber Operators & Contractors, Ltd. [1927] 1 K. B. 298; see ANsoN, CONTRACTS
(Corbin's ed. 1930) 472; RESTATMENT, CONFULCT OF LAWS (1934) § 360.
36. Cf. Mayer v. Hungarian Commercial Bank, U. S. Dist. Ct., E. D. N. Y., July
28, 1937.
37. Cf. American Union Bank v. Swiss Bank Co., 40 F. (2d) 446 (C. C. A. 2d,
1930); Aachen & Munich Fire Ins. Co. v. Guaranty Trust Co., 27 F. (2d) 674 (C. C. A.
2d, 1928); Richard v. Credit Suisse, 242 N. Y. 346, 152 N. E. 110 (1926); Sokoloff
v. National City Bank, 239 N. Y. 158, 145 N. E. 917 (1924).
38. See 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) 1272; RESTATE.MENT, CONFLIC OF
LAWS (1934) § 358. But see Cook, Contracts and the Conflict of Laws (1936) 31 ILL.
L. Rzv. 150 et seq.
39. See Louis Dreyfus v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd., 43 F. (2d) 824 (C. C. A. 2d,
1930) ; Compania de Inversiones Internacionales v. Industrial Mortgage Bank of Fin-
land, 269 N. Y. 22,198 N. E. 617 (1935).
40. Foreign jurisdictions have changed the place of payment in like manner but have
not resorted to the doctrine of restitution. German Supreme Court, Sept. 19, 1923.
107 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen 121; Skandia Ins. Co. v. Swedish
Nat'l Debt Office, Swedish Court of Appeals, April 16, 1935, 33 BUTIN DE, L' INSTITUT
JURIDIQUE INTERNATIONAL 142, 145.
41. St. Pierre v. South American Stores, Ltd. (1937) 1 All Eng. Rep. 206; Ger-
man Supreme Court, July 1, 1930, (1930) Die Deutsche Rechtsprechung auf dem Ge-
biet des internationalen Privatrechts 49 no. 15; Austrian Supreme Court, Apr. 24,
1936, 18 Rechtsprechung 146 no. 224; March 11, 1936, 18 Rechtsprechung 67 no. 95 sem-
ble; ef. De Be&he v. South American Stores, Ltd. [1935] A. C. 148.
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promise s Notwithstanding this general rule, there are two methods by
which the creditor might secure satisfaction of his debt.
First, the debt may be immunized against the prohibitions in force at the
debtor's domicile by a stipulation in the contract that the creditor may, at
his option, demand payment not only at the debtor's residence but also at
designated places in other countries. Option of place clauses, not infrequent
in international bond issues, are ordinarily coupled with a provision that
payment at the alternative places shall be made in the respective local cur-
rencies either at a fixed or at the current rate of exchange.4 3 In either case
a creditor demanding payment at one of the alternative places removes his
claim from the restrictions in force at the debtor's domicile. For the rule
that matters concerning the termination of an obligation are determined
by the laws of the place of performance, though not always an unfailing
guide, is supported here by the very purpose of the option clause, which is
to protect the foreign investor against the vicissitudes of the debtor's domestic
law." It has been suggested that an option to demand payment in another
currency at the current rate rather than at a fixed rate of exchange is merely
for the "convenience" of the bondholder in obviating the necessity of going
to the debtor's domicile to collect payment and therefore is not determina-
tive of the applicable law.45 But this argument overlooks the fact that in
the absence of such a clause the bondholder could cash his matured bonds
and coupons through his own banker at no substantial cost, since the "cur-
42. Austrian Supreme Court, Sept 25, 1934, 16 Rechtsprechung 206. But neither
a surety nor the owner of real estate pledged in the creditor's country for the foreign
debt may avail himself of the principal debtor's defense based on his domiciliary
prohibitions. Compagnie Gen&ale v. Simon Herzig & Sons, 89 Misc. 573, 153 N. Y.
Supp. 717 (Sup. Ct. 1915); Nathan-Institut A. G. v. Schweizerische Bank fOr Kapital-
anlagen, Swiss Supreme Court, Sept. 18, 1934, 60 Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen
Bundesgerichts II, 294; Compagnie 'Urbaine v. Etablissement Bernard et Devavrin,
Appellate Court of Paris, Nov. 8, 1935, 34 BuU.ErxN DE ,i'IzsTITrU JUMDIQUE IN=-
NATIoNrAL 260 no. 9364.
43. See Nussbaum, Mdtiple Currency and Index Clauses (1936) 84 U. or PA. L.
Rnv. 569; Rabel, Golddollarmaleihen mit Vereinbarung des New Yorker Rechts (1936)
10 ZanscnamFr Flm AuSLXnDISCnES UND ITERNATiONALEs PRIVATRECUT 492, 497 et
seq.; SEIGNOL, L'oProN DE CHANGE Er L'OPrioN DE PLACE (1935).
44. Anglo-Continentale Treuhand A. G. v. St. Louis S. AV. Ry., 81 F. (2d) 11
(C. C. A. 2d, 1936), cert. denied, 298 U. S. 655 (1936) ; King v. International Trustee
[1937] A. C. 500; German Supreme Court, Sept. 20, 1920, 100 Entscheidungen des
Reicbgerichts in Zivilsachen 79; see RESTATEm!ENT, CoNFc? opr LtAws (1934) §§356,
360.
45. Appellate Court of Cologne, Sept. 13, 1935, [1936] Jumsmscns WocENu-
scmuYT 203; N. V. Koninklijke Nederlandsche Mij. v. Vereeniging voor den Effec-
tenhandel, Appellate Court of s'Gravenhage, Netherlands, Jan. 14, 1935, [1935] Neder-
landsche Jurisprudentie 119, reversed, Netherlands Supreme Court, March 13, 1936
[1936] Nederlandsche Jurisprudentie 497. Contra: P. P. G. C. v. Soci~tis Siemens et
Halske et Siemens Schuckertwerke, Tribunal Civil de la Seine, July 23, 1936, 3 Nou-
VELLE REvUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL Psuvk 792.
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rent buying rate of exchange," which forms the basis of computation accord-
ing to the option clause, includes the costs of collection at the debtor's
domicile. 46 Consequently it would seem that the real purpose of both types
of clauses is to impose the risk of transferability on the debtor.
Secondly, a creditor might possibly avoid the general rule that a discharge
authorized by German law is a valid defense by arguing that the debtor may
not rely on that law because it violates the public policy of the forum.4 7 Since
public policy is at best a vague concept, it has been recognized that unless
checked it may be destructively applied to interfere with the normal play of
private international law principles. Mere divergence from domestic law
therefore does not justify exclusion of the foreign law ;41 nor does identity
of the foreign with the domestic law guarantee the former against exclusion.4
Rather to justify exclusion the foreign statute must interfere with an imi-
portant interest of the forum.
When suit is brought by an American creditor, it requires no close con-
sideration of the currency restrictions to conclude that they adversely affect
an important American interest, for their main purpose is to protect the
German national economy at the expense of foreign creditors.50 This treat-
ment of American creditors is not only repugnant to the spirit of the equal
protection clauses of the Federal Constitution, but has met with the express
condemnation of the Department of State.5 1 Although foreign moratoria52
and gold clause abrogations 53 have in some cases been found reconcilable
with the forum's public policy, these cases should not be determinative of
46. See GUARANTY TRUST CO. OF NEW YORK, How BusINEss wiTu FonmaN
COUNTRIES IS FINANCED (1921) 8-9.
47. See Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Siemens & Halske A. G., 15 F.
Supp. 927 (S. D. N. Y. 1936), aff'd, 84 F. (2d) 993 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936), cert. denied,
299 U. S. 585 (1936); Glynn v. United SteelWorks Co., 160 Misc. 405, 289 N. Y.
Supp. 1037 (Sup. Ct. 1935). For foreign holdings see NEUMANN, op. cit. supra note
19, at 35 et seq.
48. Comment (1933) 33 COL. L. REV. 508, 518.
49. German Supreme Court, May 28, 1936, (1936) JuRIsTIscHE WOCHENSCnRI"
2058; see NEUMANN, op. cit. supra note 19, at 47; WOLF, INTERNATIONALES PRIVAT-
RECHT (1933) 43. Contra: Austrian Supreme Court, Sept. 25, 1934, (1934) Rechtspre-
chung 206.
50. It has been urged that the German legislation is not directed against citivens
of foreign countries but against foreign residents regardless of their citizenship. Diet-
rich, supra note 19, at 3014.
51. See notes of the Department of State to the German Government, note 17,
supra. The attitude of the State Department carries great weight in determining public
policy. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U. S. 324 (1937), (1937) 47 YALE L J. 292,
294.
52. See Lorenzen, Moratory Legislation Relating to Bills and Notes (1919) 28 YALE
L. J. 324; Ghiron, Moratorie e regressi nel diritto inteniazionale privato (1915) RiViSTA
Di DxIrro INTERNAZIONALE 152.
53. See Nussbaum, Comparative and International Aspects of American Gold Clause
Abrogation (1934) 44 YALE L. J. 53; (1937) 46 YAL L. J. 891; Rabel, supra note 43.
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the problem here involved, for currency restrictions perform an entirely dif-
ferent function. Moratoria and gold clause enactments are intended to aid
the individual debtor by extending additional time for payment or by re-
ducing the principal amount, regardless of the nationality of the creditor.
On the other hand, currency restrictions, since they do not relieve the debtor
of his obligation but rather direct him to pay a German depositary, aid the
individual debtor only in so far as they protect the national currency and
prevent a financial collapse. Moratoria and gold clause legislation apply
equally to creditors of all nationalities, while the currency regulations dis-
criminate against foreign creditors. American courts cannot be indifferent
when protection for a foreign economy is thus sought at the expense of
American creditors."
Although public policy would probably be invoked to aid American suitors,
no exertion of public policy is to be expected in behalf of foreign creditors
seeking to escape the currency restrictions of their own country.'5 They are
not the victims of discrimination; and to protect them against the general
laws of their own government would infringe on the comity due to the foreign
nation.56 But between the extremes of safeguarding the domestic interests
and of refraining from interference with the foreign government lies the
penumbra created by the "relativity" of public policy.T There is no American
54. Cf. Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 176, 183-4 (1877); Blanchard v. Russell, 13
Mass. 1, 6 (1816); STORY, CoNrucr oF LAws (8th ed. 1883) 478, 481. Foreign juris-
dictions have refused to recognize currency restrictions on the ground that they are
"political" or "penal" statutes. Geissmann v. Benzinger, Appellate Court of Colmar,
France, Feb. 16, 1937, [1937] Revue Juridique d'Alsace et de Lorraine 469. For addi-
tional cases see NEUsANN, op. cit. supra note 19, at 3, 17.
55. The protection afforded by American public policy has frequently been denied
to foreigners. Heine v. New York Life Insurance Co., 50 F. (2d) 382 (C. C. A. 9th,
1931); Dougherty v. Equitable Life Ass. Soc., 266 N. Y. 71, 193 N. E. 897 (1934);
see United States v. Belmont, 301 U. S. 324, 327 (1937). But the restriction is not an
absolute one. Holtzer v. Deutsche Reichsbalngesellshaft, 159 Misc. 830, 290 N. Y.
Supp. 181 (Sup. Ct 1936), aff'd, N. Y. L. J., Oct. 16, 1937, p. 1182, col. 5 (1st Dep't).
And by assignment to an American citizen, a non-resident alien's claim may secure the
protection of American public policy. Frenkel & Co. v. L'Urbaine Fire Ins. Co. of Paris,
251 N. Y. 243, 167 N. E. 430 (1929).
56. De Beiche v. South American Stores, Ltd. [1935] A. C. 148; St. Pierre v. South
American Stores, Ltd. [1937] 1 All Eng. Rep. 206 (in neither case was public policy
argued); Appellate Court of Hamburg, May 16, 1929, (1930) Hanseatische Rechts-und
Gerichtszeitschrift B 743. But see Bickel & Cie v. Schfirch, Swiss Supreme Court,
Feb. 19, 1936, 62 Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts II, 103; Bron-
stein v. Banque Russo-Asiatique, Appellate Court of Paris, June 30, 1933, 60 JourwAL
DmU DROIT INTERNATIONAL (CLUNF.T) 963; NEUMANN, op. cit. supra note 19, at 50 et seq.,
113.
57. See Kosters, Public Policy in Private International Law (1920) 29 YALE L. J.
745, 757-8; Comments (1923) 32 YALE L J. 471, 473, (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1463, 1470;
1 Kahn, AB ANDLUNGEN ZUM INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHIT (1928) 161; NUSSDAUM,
DEuTcHES INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT (1932) 63.
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precedent determining whether the citizen of a third country may invoke
the forum's public policy for protection against the discrimination by the
debtor's domiciliary statutes.5 8 This much may, however, be suggested. Neu-
trality of the forum during the world war was a sufficient ground to reject
the belligerents' prohibitions against trading with the enemy, even where a
non-citizen of the forum was benefited by the rejection." Economic neu-
trality, it would seem, should dictate the same result with respect to foreign
regulations that are wielded as the weapons of economic warfare.
58. Foreign courts have at times allowed non-citizens of the forum to invoke the
forum's public policy against the German currency statute. Zenith A. T. v. Baer,
Sondheimer & Co., Municipal Court of Oslo, Feb. 13, 1936, Sj6fartstidende of Feb.
19, 1936 (Dutch plaintiff) ; District Court of Zuirich, July 3, 1934, File No. 2542/1933,
cited by NEUMANN, op. cit. supra note 19, at 57 (Dutch plaintiff).
59. Compagnie Universelle v. United States Service Co., 84 N. J. Eq. 604, 95 Atl.
187 (Ch. 1915), aff'd, 85 N. J. Eq. 601, 96 AtI. 292 (1916) ; Bryce, White & Sons, Ltd.
v. Henkel & Co., Netherlands Supreme Court, Nov. 2, 1917, (1919) 46 JOURNAL Dt
DRoiT INTERNATIONAL (CLUNET) 425; La Nationale v. Biermann, Swiss Supreme
Court, Apr. 17, 1916, 42 Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts II, 179;
see cases cited in Niboyet, De I'Effet en Pays Neutre des Mesures de Guerre (1920)
16 REvuE DE DRoiT INTERNATIONAL PRIVf ET DE DROIT PANAL INTERNATIONAL (DAMRAS-
LAPRADELLE) 248.
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